Bashar, Muammar, and the “Battle of the Storm Drain”

I will not add my knife to the other knives that have been plunged into Muammar Gaddafi’s back after his death.  This is not to mention the slaps, punches, insults, and humiliation that he was subject to prior to his execution at the hands of the Libyan rebels, who exacted their revenge on him after suffering more than 40 years of disgrace, degradation, tyranny, intimidation, and suppression.  What concerns us here is a number of lessons that “everybody” should pay attention to, particularly Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh: the most important lesson is that the suppressed and abused populations outlast autocratic regimes.  The Libyan people offered up almost 50,000 martyrs, and they were ready to offer many times that number, just to rid themselves of their mad tyrant.   In fact, many nations have found this motivation – seeking to free themselves from the shackles of injustice and tyranny – to be a source of strength.  As for such regimes, their only motivation is to remain in power, and that is nothing more than the motivation of gang leaders and criminal militias.

Al-Assad and Saleh are gambling on winning the waiting game, believing that Mubarak and Ben Ali took the decision to step down from power prematurely.  They believe that Mubarak should have listened to the now famous advice that “they’re nothing more than some youth” in reference to the Tahrir Square protests.  This is the reason why Gaddafi, al-Assad, and Saleh pursued a policy of brutal violence with the objective of quelling their respective uprisings.  Yet the resounding downfall of Gaddafi has come as a shock to both the Syrian and Yemeni presidents, particularly as the Libyan people’s victory represents the first of its kind in the Arab Spring revolutions. The Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions were both peaceful, and some people were betting that the Libyan people’s armed revolution would fail.  If this had happened, this would provide a dangerous precedent with regards to quelling the two other revolutions taking place in our region.  However the “Battle of the storm Drain” [in reference to the storm drain where Gaddafi hid prior to his capture and death] has shown that this gamble has failed to pay off, and has resulted in a loss [in the eyes of the Syrian and Yemeni presidents] as significant as Gaddafi’s loss of life.

However imagine if the Gaddafi regime had been successful in quelling the popular uprising against it.  This, of course, would have had a catastrophic impact on the Syrian and Yemeni people and served as an incentive for the respective regimes to pursue a policy of brutal violence.  Therefore gloom and suppressed fear prevailed in Damascus and Sanaa upon hearing the news of Gaddafi’s defeat and the humiliating details surrounding his death.   For the Syrian and Yemeni regimes, the battle of the storm drain should serve as notice that the military solution is no solution at all, and that their only chance to escape unscathed is to offer real and genuine reform.  The Syrian and Yemeni people have received the message sent by the death of Gaddafi, which has served to bolster their hopes that they will emerge victorious.  As for the Syrian and Yemeni regimes, this represents the end of their hopes and the beginning of their suffering.

As for the rest of the peaceful and tranquil Arab states, it should not regard Gaddafi’s humiliating downfall as one that is of no concern to them, for whether we like it or not, people inspire and motivate one another.  The best evidence of this can be seen in the fact that China attempted to suppress news of the Arab revolutions, despite the fact that China is considerably distant from our Arab world, linguistically, spiritually, geographically, and culturally.  There is therefore even more ways that different Arab populations can influence one another, particularly as we can communication with one another with the simple touch of a button.  Therefore gambling that any Arab nation is exempt from what is happening in our region is a high-risk strategy.  Revolutions can sweep through a region like a flood, and therefore all other Arab states must protect themselves by conducting essential reform, fighting corruption, and paying attention to the demands of the youth.

Finally, I would like to point out that the collapse of Arab regimes have occurred in a number of different manners; in Egypt and Tunisia, the president’s resignation preceded the collapse of the regime, whilst in Libya the regime collapsed long before the leader’s eventual demise.  As for Syria and Yemen, all signs indicate that the president and regime’s demise will occur simultaneously.