Iran and the Brotherhood: Take the rough with the smooth

The Iranian specter, General Qassim Suleimani, is threatening the entire world, particularly America, with “dozens of Irans” in the Middle East, with Egypt being transformed into a “second Iran”, indistinguishable from the original.

The statement made by the commander of the Qods Force, the architect of Iranian terrorist networks across the world, and the teacher of Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon and Moqtada al-Sadr in Iraq, is not an absurd one, but rather this rare public statement from Suleimani afforded him the ability to practice a form of psychological warfare against the foes of Iran.  Incidentally, this is not just the US – as Suleimani himself claims – but also the majority of Arab states; however the Iranian specter took the decision to turn a blind eye to the Arab states for propaganda reasons.

Iran is on alert, and it wants to “incorporate” these Arab revolutions into the Iranian cocktail.  During the early stages of the collapse of the Egyptian “state”, with regards to what was called and is continuing to be called the “Egyptian revolution” the Iranian Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei praised what he described as the “Islamic Awakening” revolution, saying that this revolution contained a return to the spirit of Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of the Wali al-Faqih [Guardian of the Jurists].  This same tune was repeated by every Iranian leader, whether military or civilian, as well as Iran’s followers in Lebanon like Hassan Nasrallah.  However this tune was distorted when the waves of the revolution reached Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, and Khamenei and his camp decided to turn a blind eye [to the revolution in Syria] and speak with two tongues.  So Tehran said that what happened in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were Khomeinist Islamic Awakening revolutions, whereas what is happening in Syria is a conspiracy hatched by the great Satan [US], the little Satan [Britain], and others.

The Syrian popular revolution represents the major crack in Iran’s propaganda, and it has served to confuse all those who follow the speeches of defiance and resistance that have been issued from Tehran over the past few years.  These speeches have seen all conflicts and complexities in the region being simplified to be viewed within a “fabricated” context, namely a dichotomy between moderation and resistance, or between the forces affiliated to the American project and those affiliated to the Islamic nationalist project.  This has seen the rationalization and justification of Iranian interests – not to mention the interests of the al-Assad regime – in the region, and woe unto whoever dares to have a different point of view or criticize the latter camp, including Al-Jazeera, Al-Quds newspaper, [Mohamed Hassenein] Heikal, and the microphones of the Muslim Brotherhood!

Now one mask after another has been exposed, as [Palestinian poet] Mahmoud Darwish said [in his famous poem “The Mask has Fallen”], and so now we see the silent killer, Qassim Suleimani, exposing what was hidden and revealing what was not known, announcing that Iran wants these Arab revolutions to be transformed into “dozens of Irans” in every sense of the word.  In other words, Tehran wants these countries to be along the lines of the tamed Iraq of Nouri al-Maliki, who employed the capabilities of the Iraqi state to rescue its sectarian and political ally Bashar al-Assad.  Indeed we have see the news that Germany and other European countries have refused to sell sophisticated communication equipment that allow mobile phone communication to be spied upon to Baghdad for fear that this technology will find its way into the hands of the suppressive al-Assad regime.  We have heard that the al-Maliki regime is providing a “bridge” of legitimacy that allows Bashar al-Assad and Maher al-Assad to continue to suppress the Syrian people.  Prior to this, accusations were also made that the al-Maliki government was passing high-tech and sophisticated internet spy technology to the al-Assad regime.

In short, the Iranian center of gravity has shifted to Baghdad, and Iraq has become – under Nouri al-Maliki – the new Syria, with Tehran relying upon it, and that is why Iranian Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei appointed one of the religious references who supports him – namely Ayatollah Shahroudi – to oversee Iraq from an ideological standpoint and to put forward political Shiite rhetoric, as well as to support Nouri al-Maliki.

Iran believes that it has achieved a victory in subjugating and utilizing Iraq, and it wants to repeat this model in the rest of the Arab states that are suffering from unrest, and that is why it has turned a blind eye to the Arab Spring project against the al-Maliki government, instead lending its support to the Iraqi regime, despite the outrageous corruption and the clear inability of the al-Maliki government.  Iran has also nakedly announced its full backing of the Bashar al-Assad regime, which is shedding the blood of the Syrian people; all the while Tehran continues to praise the purity of the Arab popular uprisings and revolutions against tyranny and injustice!

What is Iran relying upon to achieve its aspirations of “dozens of Irans?”

Is it relying upon the victory of Rashid Ghannouchi’s al-Nahda party in Tunisia?  Is it relying upon the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and their ilk – in addition to the [Shiite] Huthis – in Yemen, not to mention the Justice and Development party in Morocco, along with the rise of the Islamists in Libya, and their Muslim Brotherhood and Jihadist-linked ideology?

Is the Iranian optimism in this regard logical?

In one respect, yes, for there can be no doubt that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, or at least the Mahdi Akef and Mohamed Badea contingent – along with Salim Al-Awa – have been friends of Iran, and partners in shaping and “Arabizing” Iranian Khomeinist rhetoric for our region over the past decade, and there is no need to repeat Akef and al-Awa’s statements in this regard!

Whilst Ghannouchi’s statements with regards to regional policies were similar to Iranian statements in this regard, this is not to mention the openness of the al-Nahda party with regards to policies on women and civil democracy, but that is another issue.

However it can be said that this convergence and agreement [on issues] was when the Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia were not in power, and so they wanted to shelter under the umbrella of the Iranian “state”, despite the problems this caused them in terms of Sunni views on Shiite beliefs, and despite these political parties having to exert a lot of effort in defending themselves against charges of being Iranian agents.  However now these same parties are absolved from this, after they entered the tent of power, and so now the west has recognized their legitimacy and the doors of the world are open to them.  At the same time the regime of the mullahs in Tehran continues to suffer from regional and international “isolation”, therefore the position of the Islamists today in their own countries – in terms of regional and international legitimacy – is even stronger than the position of the Khomeinists in Iran.

Can a single description or view be applied with regards to these Islamists who have obtained a lot of political power in their own countries, and can Iran deal with them all in the same manner?  Can we compare between the Libyan Islamists, whether we are talking about the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafits, who received help and support from Qatar, the UAE, and NATO, to defeat Gaddafi and reach power, with the Egyptian Islamists who – until recently – were close friends with Tehran?

This is not to mention the issue of comparing the Syrian Islamists, who are the enemies of Bashar al-Assad, with other Islamists who enjoy good relations with Iran.

Perhaps the tables have turned, and Iran now finds itself courting the Muslim Brotherhood or the Islamists in the countries who are seeking to gain power after these parties previously sought the aid of Iran.  Indeed, there is even a chance of a fierce struggle breaking out between Tehran’s mullahs and these Islamist parties because they are coming out of the same ideological climate and so this struggle may be focused on the issue of who is more entitled to lead Arab society?  In this context, the Arab Sunni Islamists may need to distance themselves from Iran, particularly as their previous closeness could serve as something of an embarrassment in a sectarian and nationalist sense.  Perhaps the recent enmity – prior to the Arab Spring – between one Sunni political Islamist figure – namely Youssef al-Qaradawi – and Iran and Shiiism was a prelude or preamble to what we might see in the future.

In any case, we are living in difficult circumstances, and it is too early to make the assertion that this party or that political trend will monopolize power in a clear and easy manner, or that the earthquake that struck the Arab world has come to an end. Therefore perhaps Iran wants to pre-empt things, by reminding their Islamist friends of yesterday to pay their dues to Iran today.

Perhaps the Iranians want to remind the Arab Islamists of the famous Arab poem that goes:

If the honorable become wealthy, they must remember

Who kept company with them when they were poor.