Why is it an initiative to save al-Assad?

When I said, a few days ago, that the Arab League initiative towards Syria was nothing but an initiative to save al-Assad, I was not exaggerating. This is evidenced by the fact that since the al-Assad regime’s announcement that it had accepted the initiative, nothing has changed on the ground; Syrians continue to be killed, whilst the army and the Shabiha militia have not been withdrawn from the streets.

Going against all the terms of this Arab initiative, the al-Assad regime launched a call for Syrian activists to turn themselves in, in order to ensure their amnesty.  This is a clearly exploitative move from the regime, something it has done previously in all agreements it has entered into, not only during the era of Bashar al-Assad but throughout the four decades of the Baathist regime in Syria. The al-Assad regime today is playing its usual game; agreeing to a proposal and then failing to implement its terms. It did this in Lebanon and in Iraq, and it has done the same [in agreements] with the Saudis, the Turks, the Americans and the French, and today it is doing precisely the same thing with the Arab League!

When we say that the Arab initiative – regardless of who was behind it – is nothing but an initiative to save Bashar al-Assad, the reason for this is clear and simple. The Arab initiative is not comparable to the Gulf initiative towards Yemen, for there is a very fundamental difference between the two.  The Gulf initiative towards Yemen says that the proposed dialogue should focus on the transfer of power, in other words it is an initiative that will ultimately lead to the departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. As for the initiative relating to Syria, this includes calling for a dialogue, but does not place any ceiling or framework on this dialogue, so the question is: what will this dialogue be about?  Will it focus on the departure of Bashar al-Assad, and the peaceful transfer of power? Or will the dialogue aim to force the opposition into a corner, and compel it to apologize to the al-Assad regime for harassment and disturbing the public peace?

This is completely unacceptable, of course!  How can the opposition be asked to take part in dialogue without there being any framework or predetermined subject in place?  Even if al-Assad responded – which he won’t – to demands to withdraw his troops from the streets and stop his brutal killing machine, what about the nearly 4,000 Syrians who have died at the hands of the regime? Can we say to their families “let bygones be bygones”? This is unreasonable, unthinkable, and it is shameful that the Arab League should accept this in any way, shape, or form, especially as this is the same organization which came to the aid of the Libyans who found themselves at the mercy of Muammar Gaddafi, calling on the international community to intervene in order to save them.   Why does the Arab League today refuse to take the same line with the al-Assad regime, which is no less murderous, devious and brutal than the ousted regime of Muammar Gaddafi?

Therefore, and with reference to all of the above, the Arab League’s proposal can only be described as an initiative to save Bashar al-Assad, at the expense of all the tragedies suffered by the Syrian people. The Arab initiative towards Syria cannot be compared to the Gulf initiative towards Yemen, for there is a fundamental difference. The proposed dialogue regarding the Yemeni issue is about the transfer of power and the departure of President Saleh, whilst the proposed dialogue in Syria seems aimed solely at prolonging the life of the al-Assad regime; nothing more, nothing less.